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3. FORECAST: ROMANIA'S ECONOMY IN 2005 
SAR surveyed a panel of experts and brings to you their economic 
forecasts for the year ahead in a short introductory section. 
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causes of their limitations, and evaluates their potential to bring about 
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17. GOVERNANCE 
SAR advances a governing agenda complementary to those requested 
by the EU and IMF; this agenda would both push reforms further and 
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budget is mounting 
27. REGIONAL 
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FORECAST 
 
In mid-January 2005 SAR interviewed a panel of economic experts1 and asked 
them what they thought this year would bring in terms of macro developments. 
We also asked a number of open questions about major events that could 
impact the economy. This introduction provides a synopsis of what experts 
answered. 
MAIN MACRO INDICATORS IN 2005 – SUCCESS IS EXPECTED IN ALL AREAS 
 Average Margin (min-max) 
Growth, % GDP 6,2 5 – 7,5 
Inflation rate, % 8 7 – 9 
Account deficit, % 6,5 5 – 7 
Budget deficit, % 1,4 1 – 1,8 
Growth of BET stock market 
index, % 
62 40 – 100 
The economy continues to grow, although a little bit more slowly than = in 2004, 
when the upgrowth was indeed outstanding. Our group of experts still count on 
a slight fall of the inflation rate and on deficits being held within manageable 
limits. Yet they were still reserved about official inflation rates which – they said – 
were just an average of the “real” inflation rate of the urban sector (reliant on 
the circulation of money) which hovers around 13%, and the rate of the barter-
based rural economy which is practically 0%. The evolution of the stock market, 
which is probably the most unpredictable indicator of all others that we have 
included on our list, will of course generate the highest margin of variation of 
any forecast: from a growth of 40% to one of 100%. Both figures are anyhow 
well above the interest attached to bank deposits or any other financial 
instruments.  
Based on previous experience, SAR is inclined to consider that these figures are 
realistic – perhaps even a little bit conservative.  Similar forecasts that were 
made a year  ago, with almost the same panel of experts, overestimated 
inflation and the budget deficit by 1% and seriously underrated economic 
growth (by over 3%), which was the surprise-indicator of 2004.  
                                                 
1 We wish to thank the following experts for their contribution: Lucian Albu, [Institute for 
Economic Forecast]; Bogdan Baltazar, Baltazar, Bloom & Pîrvulescu; Radu Crăciun, senior 
analyst – ABN Amro; professor Daniel Dăianu, ASE ; Matei Păun, Romania Think Tank; Ilie 
Şerbănescu, financial analyst; Liviu Voinea, Group for Applied Economics. 
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WHAT WILL BE THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF OPENING THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT IN 
APRIL? 
The topic is heavily debated these days and there are talks about the likelihood 
to postpone this measure until mid-2005 or even the end of 2005 – therefore our 
question seems  all the more relevant.  Panel experts agree that the capital 
inflow will grow and so will the pressure  on ROL to rise and thus augment the 
current account deficit. Yet the range of negative consequences that were 
predicted to happen just after coming in line with the free international 
competition varies a lot: from (i) "dangerously destabilising the current 
account", followed by possible massive outflows of funds over the second half 
of the year, which would force BNR into intervening to support the ROL; and up 
to a more optimistic view that (ii) immediate tension will be defused quickly and 
long-term effects will actually be positive”. There are also views that 
consequences of this liberalisation are overrated though, because "foreigners 
that really wanted to make the most of the ROL/Euro or ROL/USD interest 
differential actually did it by way of Romanian special purpose vehicles that are 
already in place".  
DO YOU THINK THAT STRATEGIC INVESTORS WILL BUY BCR OR CEC IN 2005? 
The unanimous opinion is that existing liquidity, extensive network, etc. is what 
makes CEC [the Savings Bank] more attractive to any prospective investor than 
BCR for the time being, therefore if the government is really determined to sell it 
out, then that can happen in 2005. One of our experts explained that past 
indecisions  are still a deterrent to investors when it comes to BCR: interest to 
"sever the cord" that connects this bank to the state has not been too great in 
Romania so far. And the key to success in both cases is a professional and 
consistent behaviour of the government that should stop sending out 
contradictory signals just as it did in the past.  
WILL THE GOVERNMENT USE THE CAPITAL MARKET FOR PRIVATISATIONS IN 2005, JUST 
AS THE NEW FINANCE MINISTER SAID? 
 Most likely yes. Nevertheless – even if it will – the government will still not offer 
significant stocks, but mostly non-controlling ones. Our analysts told us that, as a 
general rule, strategic privatisations are not conducted through the stock 
market. Yet there is indeed a request of new “interesting” companies on the 
stock market and expectations have been fuelled by recent statements of 
government officials who are said to become “ideologically and practically 
compromised”, if they fail to put at least some minority stocks on sale.  
WHAT IS YOUR ANTICIPATION OF THE MAIN ECONOMIC OBSTACLES THAT THE 
GOVERNMENT WILL ENCOUNTER IN 2005? 
Answers indicated the following: control the deficits (the budget deficit 
and the current account deficit), avoid the risk of “overheating” 
economy further to the fiscal relaxation, and the challenge  to increase 
the labour productivity. Additionally, our analysts also talked about 
enforcing the relevant provisions of the acquis communautaire: 
competition, budget programming, and commercial courts. 
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POLITICS 
HOW BIG A CHANGE? 
 
Romania has a new President and government. But apart 
that, what exactly will change? 
 
 
Why elections went the way they did 
Romania’s 2004 general and presidential elections produced in the end 
a new government. Since the transfer of power was smooth one could 
be tempted to put elections behind and look forward to the EU 
integration of the country. The signing of accession treaty is scheduled 
for April 2005. However, these elections were not business as usual. For 
the first time in the last ten years there were allegations of fraud 
affecting 3-5% of the vote2. For instance, research institute IMAS 
published analysis on electoral data from the ballot day showing 
significant correlations between invalid votes or supplementary electoral 
lists, on one side, and the vote for SDP, on the other. In other words, 
districts where outsiders showed up in large numbers to vote despite 
being registered elsewhere on permanent electoral lists (and they were 
therefore registered on supplementary lists) voted significantly above 
the national average with former government party SDP3. There might 
have been all along the intent to fraud elections, as transcripts of 
electoral commission of Chamber of Deputies show the decision not to 
use voting cards was deliberate. "The OSCE/ODIHR Assessment Mission 
did not receive any convincing information that explained the 
suspension of the use of voter cards for these elections. This, combined 
with the possibility to vote in any polling station, has the potential to 
open the door for multiple voting", stated the OSCE/ODIHR Assessment 
Mission. According to the law, no institution is compelled to investigate 
the fraud, which is supposed to be proven fully by claimants, and no 
institution had the power to declare elections invalid except county by 
county. The OSCE recommendation that ‘Any such alleged problems 
should be fully dealt with through the appropriate administrative and 
judicial processes’ was clearly not followed, as the Bureau claimed they 
do not have the legal entitlement to do any investigation and did not 
                                                 
2 By reputed Pro Democratia watchdog, for instance. 
3 Analysis is posted on the site of IMAS, www.imas.ro  
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call on prosecutors to do anything. After two days of public 
contestation, the bureau granted the right to opposition parties to 
compare supplementary lists with permanent lists and therefore check 
for multiple voting. But it was too late, as the electoral law requires that 
final results are made official 48 hours after receiving the voting results 
from districts. By the limit of the 48 hours the opposition had not even 
received, let alone checked, 10 % of the electoral lists and the election 
was declared valid.  
Newspapers documented many instances of multiple voting afterwards, 
but a final count is not yet computed. The new Romanian Parliament 
vowed to create a commission to investigate the matter, but even if 
they proved fraud the vote could not be repeated according to the 
current electoral law. The General Prosecutor (GP), traditionally 
appointed by the President at the proposal of government, failed 
entirely to take any meaningful action in due time. Although tapes 
made by journalists, including BBC journalists, of buses with multiple 
voters showed clear evidence it could have been acted upon, GP Ilie 
Botos declared on December 1st that all investigations would be made 
only after elections. Official figures show that more than 10% of those 
who voted on 28 November did so on the supplementary lists, either by 
claiming they were resident but not included in the permanent list 
(supplementary list 1) or by claiming to be in transit (supplementary list 
2). Official figures show 11 000. 000 voters in total, out of which 1 200.000 
were on supplementary lists (500000 on list 1 and 700000 on list 2). There 
was room for considerable confusion, as electoral lists were not updated 
to exclude about one million and a half people who had died or 
immigrated in the last ten years. Errors were also reported in the 
reporting of invalid votes, but the National Commission for Statistics 
claimed they had asked corrections from districts in due time. 
Correction often meant that original records of results needed to be 
retrieved and actually tampered with by presidents of local electoral 
bureaus in order to set them straight. SDP and Humanists came ahead 
of DA with a little over half million votes. 
The scandal that broke out showed that Romania has nevertheless a 
vigorous print press and civil society. Despite the electronic media’s 
restraint in covering allegations of fraud, print press, the international 
media and the domestic civil society managed to spread the news that 
elections had not been fair. The government was compelled to forbid 
supplementary lists for the second tour. Despite enjoying an eight 
percent advantage in the first round, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase lost 
the second round to challenger Traian Basescu, mayor of Bucharest. 
Basescu was then instrumental in manipulating SDP’s allies, Humanistic 
Party and Hungarians Union, to form an alliance with DA, based on just 
one seat ahead that DA had won compared to SPD with Humanists 
extracted. By end 2004 Romania had a new government after a smooth 
power transfer. 
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Fig. 1. Results of elections 2004 in Romania 
House of Senate Chamber of Deputies Presidential Elections  
Parties No of seats % No of seats % 1st round 2nd  round 
SDP + 
Humanists 
(RHU) 
57  (SDP 46) 
(RHU 11) 
37.13 132 (SDP 113) 
(RHU 19) 
36.61 40.94 48.77 
D.A. 49 31.77 113 31.33 33.92 51.23 
GRP 21 13.63 48 12.92 12.57  
HDU 10 6.23 21 6.17 5.10  
Total 137 * 332 *   
 
Fig. 2. Electoral basis of political change 
Social structure Vote 
SDP 
How much it 
explains 
Vote 
Alliance 
How much it 
explains 
Good income ↓ * ↑ * 
Young     
Superior education ↓ * ↑ * 
Urban ↓ ** ↑ ** 
Inactive ↑ * ↓ * 
Reads newspapers   ↑ * 
Regional development ↓ * ↑ * 
Ideology (left-right) ↑ ** ↑ *** 
Ideology (democracy 
best system of govt) 
  ↑ ** 
Personality (Trust in 
presidential candidate) 
↑ ***** ↑ *** 
Conjecture factors     
Family member works 
abroad 
↓ * ↑ * 
Approves direction 
country is headed for 
↑ ** ↓ ** 
Thinks corruption went up 
from last year 
↓ ** ↑ ** 
Legend: Factors on the left explain the vote for SDP and Alliance. The arrow up 
means people with a good income are more likely to vote for the Alliance; the 
arrow down means they are less likely to vote for the specific party. A complete 
model including all determinants for the vote in the same time is coded with six 
*. One star means a sixth of the total variance explain by the model, in other 
words, of the explanatory power of the model. Two stars mean the determinant 
explains a third, and so forth.  
Data: two Gallup International polls predicting results for November 28 elections. 
The table summarizes three regression models of electoral behavior. 
 
Beyond allegations of fraud, the former opposition did not do so well in 
legislative elections. The electronic media has shown bias in favor of the 
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government party before and during the campaign. But nevertheless 
the campaign produced more opportunities which were not followed. 
Demobilization of urban areas, the main playfield of Romanian elections 
was very high end September (reaching 60% in some Transylvanian 
counties) and instead of addressing this main source of votes the 
alliance D.A. was following an erratic campaign trail, especially through 
subsistence voting areas, where its chances of being voted were nil. 
Subsistence voting areas have only SDP mayors and rural elites are as a 
ground rule instrumental, by controlling resources, in securing the vote of 
the whole village for their party. The change of presidential candidates 
did not bring the needed mobilization. The alleged fraud and the media 
bias favored SDP, but the low score of the opposition is due to its 
amateurish electoral research and the overall mediocre standing on TV. 
The fraud scandal supplied the needed factor of mobilization, but if it 
would not have been for the scandal and the mobilization of civil 
society against SDP it was unlikely D.A. would have succeeded by itself 
to make its candidate a winner.   
To be fair towards Romania’s centre-right, one should examine the 
voting models. They show some older features of Romanian electoral 
behavior, but some new ones as well. For instance, age is a weaker 
predictor than it used to be in models predicting the vote for center 
right. Regional development and residence in urban areas remain 
strong predictors. Ideology is less important for SDP voters than for 
Alliance’s voters. A comparison between the determinants of the vote 
and the campaign strategies is telling indeed. The strengths of DA’s 
campaign were as follows: 
• Investment in cleaning the list of controversial candidates, leaving 
SDP in a difficult position. 
• Good investment in drafting a program, giving the impression the 
alliance is well prepared to govern. 
• Use of young people, which succeeded in promoting the idea that 
the Alliance relies on a new generation. 
• Timely initiative on pensions, which managed to establish in the 
public opinion that the Alliance preceded the SDP in getting the 
pensions straight. 
The weaknesses of DA’s electoral offer in relation with the voting models 
were as follows: 
• Too much investment in captive rural areas and insufficient 
investment in developed areas, such as Timis county, where turnout 
was very low. The electoral offer for many of these areas, not just in 
terms of program, but in terms of people on the lists, was inadequate 
and demobilized voters. 
• Too much weight on the ‘maverick’ flat tax which could not have 
possibly interested directly more than a fifth of the constituency, but 
could seriously alienate larger numbers due to the leftist propaganda 
that ‘it only brings advantage to the rich’.  
• Alienation of a category of voters to attract another, like claiming 
raise of pensions will be fed from taxes of Romanians working 
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abroad, a category which, as Figure 2 shows, was in fact significantly 
supporting the Alliance. Alienating a group of voters which is likely to 
vote for you in exchange for the doubtful support of another for an 
unrealistic promise is erroneous. 
• Considerable disorder in the electoral themes hierarchy, creating 
difficulties in understanding what the main message was.  
• Insufficient use of credibility transfer. The transfer of credibility was 
used only as a last resort, and reduced to few public characters. 
Models also show two serious social structure limitations of D.A.’s 
electoral accession: the rural residence (for the reasons explained 
above) and the inactivity. Despite having a good electoral offer for 
pensioners, and managing to attract some pensioners’ votes, DA was 
significantly less voted by inactive people (adults without a permanent 
working contract with self-employed, students and business owners 
extracted). People working with a contract are disproportionately few 
seeing Romania’s demographic situation, just around four million. This 
means that there are important limitations to persuasion for DA: it also 
means that only a change of social structure, more development, a 
different ration between the inactive and active population and a 
decrease in subsistence farmers are the keys to create a larger pool of 
votes for the center right. These developments cannot be brought 
about by persuasion campaigns, but only by social and economic 
policies. 
 
WHAT WILL THE MAIN CONTENDERS DO IN 2005? 
The DA Alliance: One step at a time 
The alliance was a success so far, and it has no serious problems. It is a 
good idea to turn it into an ever closer union. DA should create unique 
coordination bodies at all levels, so organize itself as one party, while 
keeping, however, separate judicial identities and separate 
international affiliations. Succeeding in governing should be the number 
one priority this year, not building a unique centrist party. DP should 
boost its profile within the Socialist International, and not leave all the 
room there for SDP. A Liberal statute entrusting most power to PM 
Tariceanu is the best solution. Nobody needs internal censorship from 
one’s party while in government. A possible fusion should again be 
discussed after one year in government. The fusion should be driven by 
internal need only, not by the illusory target of joining EPP in the 
European Parliament. Firstly, Romanians overestimate the influence of 
the EP and miss to see that most of the influence at the European level is 
not at the Parliament’s level, but the Council and the Commission, 
where traditional diplomacy works still very well. In more advanced 
European countries, politicians go to EP after giving up domestic politics, 
where the real stakes are. Secondly, in no other country on earth did 
two partied do something in order to fit to European Parliament. Thirdly, 
no Orthodox country has ever seen something like Christian Democracy, 
which is an organic Catholic movement, embedded in the grassroots of 
Catholic community organization. There is no way that Romania can 
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have a powerful Christian Democracy, a concept imported with little 
understanding. Not only the two parties within the Alliance do not need 
anything ‘popular’ or ‘Christian-Democrat’ to preserve their 
constituency, but also Romanian National Peasants cannot possibly 
hope to be revived as Christian Democrats. They should instead reinvent 
themselves as National Peasants. 
SDP: Finding the Third Man 
Ion Iliescu is intent in hand picking his successor, who is unlikely to be 
Adrian Nastase. Several SDP leaders who claim they try to reconcile the 
two camps are in fact candidates for the ‘Third Man’ position and 
queue to being designated by Mr. Iliescu. No veritable ‘Third Man’ exists, 
unfortunately, to lead SDP on a veritable third way, blaming the 
infamous transcripts on their main characters and starting afresh with 
those who have not compromised themselves. Possible names would 
have been Mircea Geoana, Mihai Tanasescu, Ioan Rus, Sorin Oprescu, 
but for now the party is so squeezed between Iliescu and Nastase that 
no room exists for anyone else. As Mr. Iliescu has always been an 
indecisive man, it might turn out that no Third Man is appointed in the 
end and SDP from fear of a split ends up with an unworkable collective 
leadership. For a Third Man to emerge a Third Wing would be needed. 
And this does not exist so far, as more reform minded SDP recruits of last 
years (like the above mentioned Mr Geoana or Tanasescu) were first 
asked to serve alongside the rest in filthy domestic politics, so to become 
part of the network. This SDP strategy that nobody should be allowed to 
be better and cleaner than the rest led to the unprecedented credibility 
crisis that its leaders face now. The public enemy of December, Ion 
Iliescu, who freed Miron Cozma, is again the undisputed power broker of 
the party.   No reform can succeed where there are no reformers.   
 
AFTER ELECTIONS 
What elections solved: the dismantling of SDP’s power monopoly ends 
the major cause of corruption in Romania 
Beginning December 2004 Romania had no longer a credible 
government. The leaking of SDP leaders’ transcripts and the allegations 
of electoral fraud had by then succeeded in creating the impression 
even for some SDP supporters that their party should no longer be in 
government, but pause in order to reform itself. The bailing out of client 
company RAFO and the pardon of miners’ leader Miron Cozma by Ion 
Iliescu all contributed to the crumbling of SDP legitimacy. Under these 
circumstances the arrangements for an alternative government could 
only succeed. The power equilibrium of elections is nevertheless 
reflected not in the government, but in the Parliament, where the new 
governing coalition has a frail majority and lost key positions to SDP.  
Under these circumstances, what the elections solved so far is only the 
supremacy of one party and the administrative state capture derived 
from it. SDP lost the power over pardoning arrears and putting on hold 
corruption investigations. And this is important. It represents in itself the 
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greatest step against corruption in the past years. Unfortunately, great 
as it is, it is not enough. 
What elections did not solve: Various forms of capture still persist 
Unfortunately, Romania did not suffer from administrative state capture 
only, meaning the use of administrative public resources for the needs of 
the former government party, but also from other forms of capture, less 
formal, but equally important. Two should be a priority of the current 
government:  judiciary and media capture.  
What does this mean? The current report means by ‘capture’ the undue 
influence by ‘captors’ (oligarchic networks of influence) over what 
should normally be autonomous areas, such as media or the judiciary. 
As Romania is a young democracy, nobody expects that either 
journalists or magistrates are perfectly objective and non-partisan. What 
is expected, more generally, of the journalists’ class and the magistrates’ 
class in transition is that they reflect a plurality of views. Out of pluralism 
some imperfect objectivity should result. But pluralism was seriously 
affected in the last two years of SDP dominance, and, as SDP transcripts 
show, with intent also. As a consequence, an important part of the 
media and the judiciary became captured by oligarchic networks of 
influence featuring a relatively small number of people. These networks 
delivered to SDP governments the goods required: propaganda instead 
of fair media and biased judgments instead of fair justice. They were not 
affected by political change, and recent legal developments actually 
worked to their advantage: the magistrates can no longer be subjected 
to any open political intervention due to their self-government by 
Superior Council of Magistrates, while the media, being largely private 
and unregulated, is largely unaccountable to any official bodies.  
1. Judiciary 
There are indicators showing capture of the judiciary. Freedom House’s 
score continues to be worst of all accession countries. Romania’s score 
equals Albania’s and is far worse than Bulgaria’s. In a 2004 survey 
conducted on judges and ordered by the Ministry of Justice itself, half of 
the respondents considered that political pressures did exist4. However, 
only 19% reported direct political influence, with an additional 16% 
reporting direct influence, and 6 % pressure exerted by the 
administrative leadership of the courts. The situation is even worse in the 
case of prosecutors. No major corruption case was completed prior to 
elections except for the privatization of the fleet, a dubious political 
case. The media alleged that the file is poorly instrumented, that even 
the number of the commercial vessels under discussion is mistaken. 
Since beginning of January, a row of investigations started, ending with 
charging of quite a few famous businesspeople known for the 
protection they enjoyed in the former regime. The national 
Anticorruption Prosecutor also started to investigate SDP transcripts, and 
the General Prosecutor started to investigate the electoral files. All these 
investigations, however, feature two much on TV and resort excessively 
                                                 
4 Institute of Criminology, ‘Evaluation of the integrity and resistance to corruption of the 
judiciary’, 2003. 
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to the old arsenal of intimidation, such as preventive arrest. In the past 
years these spectacular investigations led to poor files, lost cases and 
disappointed public expectations. 
Fig. 3. Rule of law indicators compared 
Judicial Framework and 
Independence  
1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Albania 4.75 5.25 5.00 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.25 
Bosnia - 6.00 6.00 5.50 5.25 5.00 4.50 
Bulgaria 4.25 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.25 
Croatia 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.25 4.50 
Kosovo - - - - - - 6 
Macedonia 4.25 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.75 4.50 4.00 
Romania 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 
Serbia and Montenegro - 5.00 5.75 5.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 
Slovenia 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Source: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2004, www.freedomhouse.org/nit  
Legend: Scale from 1 to 7, with seven the worst performance.5 
The legislation passed in 2004 was supposed to bring fresh life to the 
judiciary. Instead, as it was conceived with minimal preoccupation that 
the judiciary should also perform, not just be independent, it risks 
transferring the conservatism of the Justice Ministry to the Superior 
Council of Magistracy. Furthermore, it leaves a vacuum of leadership in 
a crucial period, that of the anticorruption campaign. For instance, 
Romania will be assessed by the EU in March for the progress of its 
anticorruption efforts. Despite the need to push for timely and better 
quality investigations, the new legislation shields prosecutors from any 
assessment of their performance. Article 53 of Law 303/2004 claims, for 
instance, that the prosecutors with a managerial position can be 
revoked by President only at the suggestion of SCM and only as a 
disciplinary sanction.  The current interpretation of this article is that only 
by granting to a Prosecutor an ordinary sanction (legal reasons for this 
                                                 
5 This Freedom House indicator is established by experts considering the following criteria: 
1. Does the constitutional or other national legislation provide protections for fundamental 
political, civil, and human rights? (Includes freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and 
religion, freedom of association, and business and property rights.) 
2. Do the state and nongovernmental actors respect fundamental political, civil, and human 
rights in practice?  
3. Is there independence and impartiality in the interpretation and enforcement of the 
constitution?  
4. Is there equality before the law 
5. Has there been effective reform of the criminal code/criminal law?  (Consider presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, access to a fair and public hearing, introduction of jury trials, 
access to independent counsel/public defender, independence of prosecutors, and so forth.)  
6. Are suspects and prisoners protected in practice against arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, 
searches without warrants, torture and abuse, and excessive delays in the criminal justice 
system? 
7. Are judges appointed in a fair and unbiased manner, and do they have adequate legal 
training before assuming the bench? 
8. Do judges rule fairly and impartially, and are courts free of political control and influence?   
9. Do legislative, executive, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions, 
and are judicial decisions effectively enforced?  
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are unrelated to the management capacity which is under question) 
one can dismiss him or her from a managerial position, which is absurd. 
The judiciary cannot be expected to perform, especially in the filed of 
anticorruption, if neither prosecutors not their bosses cannot be 
evaluated for their performance. 
Recommendations: 
The Ministry of Justice, together with the new under consolidation SCM 
should therefore together identify and enact a strategy which should: 
• Raise the quality of investigation and prosecution in anticorruption 
cases.  
• Create clear performance indicators, which attract dismissal if 
unfulfilled 
• Start immediately a professional audit procedure into the last year 
performance of anticorruption prosecutor office and General 
prosecutor. GP has fought against transparency legislation in Court, 
and initiated extraordinary appeals against final decisions of 
Supreme Court of Justice.  . 
The General Prosecutor should immediately pull out from all 
extraordinary appeals (old SAR recommendation) now after the 
extraordinary appeal was dropped both in civil and criminal courts. It is 
rather hypocritical to claim to the EU that Romania gave up the 
infamous extraordinary appeal while tenths of cases go on. It will save 
money for the taxpayer if these cases are stopped before reaching 
Strasbourg.   
The President of Romania, who took over the anticorruption strategy 
and made it his flagship, should definitely be proactive in reforming the 
anticorruption establishment. The audit demanded by the European 
Commission might produce a series of useful recommendations. In any 
event, without improving the performance of these institutions the risks 
for the campaign remain important. It is not enough that politically 
obedient prosecutors now rush to investigate those they shielded six 
months ago. They must also produce reliable evidence and get some 
convictions.   
2. Media 
The media capture is reflected in Romania’s Freedom House press 
freedoms score, the worse of all candidate countries. Some indirect 
indicators of informal capture of the media are the tax arrears of the 
media outlets, the decreasing audience of news and current affairs 
programs at main TV stations, the small number of pundits on air, the 
same on every TV network. Media capture seems to be in some relation 
with the perceived influence of the media. In a recent survey of ECE 
ministers, Romanian ministers appear to be losing most time to discuss 
the media in the cabinet, but least time to wrap up their decisions in 
suitable media format. This is a recipe for disaster. In any event, media 
seems to influence greatly the government's agenda. One more reason 
why the governments feel a need to control it. 
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Fig. 4. Freedom of the press scores in EU accession countries 
Country  Legal Political Environment Total Status 
Bulgaria 10 13 12 35 Partly Free 
Czech 
Republic 
6 10 7 23 Free 
Estonia 6 5 6 17 Free 
Hungary 4 8 8 20 Free 
Latvia 7 4 6 17 Free 
Lithuania 5 7 6 18 Free 
Poland 6 6 7 19 Free 
Romania 13 19 15 47 Partly Free 
Slovakia 8 7 6 21 Free 
Slovenia 3 9 7 19 Free 
United States 3 6 4 13 Free 
Britain 4 8 7 19 Free 
Germany 5 6 5 16 Free 
Source: Freedom House 2004, www.freedomhouse.org  
Legend: Greater scores mean less freedom. 
 
Fig. 5. How influential media is? 
Country
  
Topics6 Time Presentation Substance Specific 
newspaper/TV 
channel 
Bulgaria 44 24 44 44 16/16 
Czech 
Republic 
10 10 43 5 10/0 
Estonia 56 53 66 33 33/33 
Hungary 40 35 43 45 10/10 
Latvia 53 48 48 43 25/23 
Lithuania 70 59 65 56 41/27 
Poland 56 53 56 27 22/7 
Romania 49 73 27 24 46/33 
Slovakia 23 64 9 14 0/0 
Slovenia 33 57 24 19 38/24 
ECE 47 49 45 33 25/18 
Source: SAR Project database7 
                                                 
6 Were the media most influential… 
...on the topics of cabinet discussions? 
…on the amount of time given to cabinet discussions 
…on the presentation of cabinet decisions 
…on the substance of cabinet decisions 
Is there any specific newspaper which has influenced your decision-making? 
Is there any specific TV programme which has influenced your decision-making? 
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The main source of problems of the media in the last years is, like in 
Russia, oligarchization. In all east central European countries the 
transformation path of the media turned at some point to pluralism due 
to competitive politics or fell back to self censorship again due to 
concentration of power and resources. Self censorship is not new for 
Romania. One of the few reforms of Gorbachev that Ceausescu copied 
was the giving up of specialized, political censors, to replace them with 
normal editors with the task to demand compliance from journalists. 
Fig. 6. Path dependent models explaining media freedom  
 
The changes brought about by the 2004 elections do not mean 
automatically that the media problems are over in Romania. Naturally, 
the new power will be granted more access and coverage. But the 
electronic media which sinned towards accurate coverage due to tax 
arrears to the state budget should not be considered as fully on the side 
of pluralism and democracy. And it certainly cannot be relied on to 
promote civic journalism. 
The solutions for mass media should be differentiated between the 
public and the private media. However, in this sensitive field one cannot 
rely on the government to act alone. To have a positive effect on the 
media system action should be taken jointly by the government with civil 
society and media organizations. 
Recommendations: 
To public broadcasters 
• Romanian TV has in key positions people whose contracts with 
Ceausescu’s secret files were published by the media. These persons 
should at least be suspended from their executive positions. The 
recent report of the Ethics Committee points to severe infringements 
of editorial rules with severe consequences such as political bias, and 
no steps were taken to replace responsible executives.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
7 The database on decision making in ECE cabinets was created as part of a project 
directed by Ferdinand Muller Rommel and Jean Blondel. The data for Romania was 
collected by Romanian Academic Society. A first report on the comparative database 
was published by Muller Rommel et al in European Journal of Political Research, fall issue 
2004.  
Path 1: 
Competitive 
politics 
Path 2: 
Oligarchization 
Glasnost 
Self-
censorship 
Censorship 
Media control 
Media pluralism
Mixture of 
partisanship and 
professionalism 
Media capture 
Self-censorship, 
vested political 
interests 
Deregulation. 
Media 
anarchy 
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To mass media committees of the Parliament 
On public broadcasting: Mass media committees of the Parliament 
which have the legal right to hold TVR accountable should start an 
investigation into the ways TVR sees fit to fulfill its public mandate and 
spend taxpayers' money. The credibility and audience of news on 
Romanian TV, despite its monopoly on broadcasting in rural areas, has 
fallen beyond even small commercial stations. It is not normal that 
everybody pays license tax, but just 2% watch public television news. In 
other ECE countries public television managed to keep audience of 
news programs, despite losing on entertainment, due to its effort to 
make in-depth coverage, different from the infotainment present on 
private TV. The Parliament should act on two different paths: on one 
hand, to suppress current abnormalities, on the other to change 
legislation to give more freedom to public TV. However, the first path is 
as important as the second, as no legislation can protect from corrupt 
practices. The only imperative legal modification is to regulate conflict 
of interest at the level of the TV board. As the law looks now it is legal to 
sit on this board and grant funds to yourself, your family and your 
department, if you are a TV producer. 
For the long run, the second path should lead to a revision of all current 
legislation, so to bring some civil society in the boards, alongside political 
members, and to grant the right to appoint general directors of public 
broadcasting agencies to a broadcasting council, not the Parliament. 
There is no ideal solution to end political subordination of public 
broadcasting, but furthering it one step is certain to help. 
On private media: Romania should consider regulating the use of public 
advertising as well as ownership of private media, which is often non-
transparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  A N D  F O R E C A S T  R E P O R T  −  2 0 0 5  
 
17 
 
 
GOVERNANCE 
 
ECONOMY AND GOVERNANCE PRIORITIES IN 2005 
How to achieve maximum output with minimum costs 
 
2005 is going to be an extremely busy year for the new government of 
the DA Alliance, which has a number of issues on its emergency agenda 
associated to both political action and the executive governance. As 
we have already pinpointed in the previous section, SAR believes that 
the new ruling parties will benefit the most if they focus primarily on 
governance, proving speed and high performance over the first half of 
the year and postponing political clarifications for the second half of the 
year, or later. Incumbents do not have too much room to manoeuvre 
anyway since the road map drawn in Brussels is demanding and tightly 
deadlined (see page 20 for a summary of the monitoring conditions that 
Romania is supposed to satisfy in terms of “Justice and Home Affairs” 
and “Competition”), and these measures require attention from topmost 
officials and resources in order to be implemented properly.  They can 
no longer be delegated to junior secretaries of state, as it was the case 
so far, whose task was to keep the foreign partners busy. 
Moreover, once negotiations with the European Union were over, a 
process that actually consisted in signing promises, we are now at a 
stage where promises must be actually fulfilled.  This stage of the game 
is played by different rules: performance will no longer be appraised 
based on how many laws have been passed and how many strategic 
plans have been sent to Brussels, but on tangible action of the 
government and the related outcome which should be measurable 
economically and socially. More specifically, Parliament's slow pace or 
non-cooperation can no longer be used as an excuse: out of the 11 
urgent measures that Brussels has required to be implemented until 
March and that are detailed on the next page, just one involves 
legislative amendments; the others can be taken by direct action of the 
government.  
Nevertheless, these 11 measures are just the beginning and the 
government knows it. There are many other economic and 
administrative measures outstanding that should have been 
implemented over the past years and that must be finalised 
immediately, even in 2005 – insofar as possible. All involve a significant 
investment of financial resources, at a time where resources are 
overstretched. This section presents a realistic view of how these priorities  
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WHAT ARE ROMANIA’S TASKS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2005 
 
On 17 December 2004, the European Council concluded formally the accession 
negotiations with Romania. By the time when the Treaty of Accession has been 
signed, which is scheduled to take place on 25 April 2005, the Government of 
Romania must prove to the European Union by concrete action that it has 
complied with the 11 conditions that were established when the “Justice and 
Home Affairs” and “Competition” chapters were closed, as follows: 
 
Brussels expects the following in March 2005, in terms of JUSTICE: 
1-2. A single multi-annual investment plan that should accurately reflect the 
calendar and progress made in implementing the Schengen Action Plan (as 
amended against the acquis communautaire) and in securing a high level of control 
and surveillance of EU’s future external borders. Stress lays on recruiting 4,438 
new border police officers and on strengthening control especially on the Eastern 
borders (Ukraine, Moldova, Black Sea).  
3. An updated action plan and a Justice Reform Strategy (including a status 
report on the implementation of the strategy), that should cover the main steps to 
implement the Law on the organisation of the Justice System, the Law on 
Magistrates and the Law on the Higher Council of Magistrates that became 
effective as of 30 September 2004. It should also prove the full functionality of the 
new random court case assignment system. 
4. Accelerate the fight against corruption of senior officials, by strictly 
enforcing the existing legislation and by securing the independence of the National 
Anti-corruption Prosecuting Office that should also present credible activity 
reports.  
5. Commission an independent audit of the results and impact of the 
National Anti-corruption Strategy adopted by the previous government, plus an 
action plan that should lay down clear budget provisions suitable to a more 
efficient anti-corruption fight.  
6. Provide proof of a legal framework that should underlay the individual activities 
of gendarmerie and police officers and their cooperation in law enforcement 
matters.  Additionally, a clear recruitment plan will be needed by mid-2005 to fill 
in the 7,000 police vacancies and 18,000 gendarmerie vacancies by 2007. 
7. An multi-annual anticrime strategy, that should provide clear action to 
diminish Romania’s role as country of origin, transit and destination of victims of 
trafficking in human beings and to prepare every year – starting March 2005 – 
credible statistics about how this phenomenon is kept in check. 
 
In terms of COMPETITION Romania must prove the following: 
8. A real control by the Competition Authority of potential state aid, including 
control over how tax, social and energy-related obligations are rescheduled. 
9. Truly functional mechanisms to monitor state aid and the anti-trust policy. 
10. Full compliance with the commitment not to give or pay state aid to steel&iron 
factories, as per the 1 January 2005 – 31 December 2008 National Restructuring 
Strategy. 
11. Allocate proper financial means and skilled human resources to the 
Competition Authority. 
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The European Parliament is scheduled to approve Romania’s EU Treaty of 
Accession on 13 April 2005 based on how successful Romania will have been in 
complying with these conditions up to the month of March. Based on the approval 
of the European Parliament, the Treaty of Accession will be signed in Brussels on 
25 April and will be ratified by all other member states. 
The European Commission will present its first monitoring report in May. 
The Commission will monitor how Romania actually implements all of the 
negotiated chapters. The Commission will flag any delay against the agreed 
calendar and any issue associated to Romania’s progress by means of letters of 
warning, and such failures will also be reported to the European Council. Should 
these issues or delays complicate, the Commission can recommend to the Council 
to implement one of the safeguard measures laid down in the Treaty of Accession 
(economy, domestic market and justice/home affairs). 
 
 
should be approached, based on three principles: simplification; 
transparentization; reducing public expenditure – with the benefit of 
satisfying the IMF requirements regarding low, or probably zero, budget 
deficit. In other words, we will not repeat here the long list of measures 
that Romania’s external partners have required. Instead we will 
advance a complementary list of measures that, once implemented, 
will bring about structural changes easing off the budgetary pressure 
that other resource-consuming reforms are creating. 
The first priority should be to revise spending budgetary commitments 
which are more or less fairly substantiated socially,   made by the 
Năstase government during the election campaign or before.  Not all 
social programmes should be terminated instantly or downsized across 
the board, because this is not feasible politically anyway. But even 
voters may perceive well a move to targeted better the expenditures 
and subsidies, whereas the budget impact will surely be positive. Here is 
a list of programmes to illustrate this, yet there are quite a good number 
of them and a systematic review of these programmes may lead to 
substantial savings and a more efficient social policy. 
• Heating power subsidies given to producers (power generation 
plants) must be cut down gradually and that decrease should be 
partially compensated by directly subsidising end-users (households, 
through means-testing). Maintaining the current subsidising structure 
is extremely costly (6,000 billion ROL, i.e. close to 1,5-2% of the state 
budget) and blocks the restructuring process by sponsoring 
technological inefficiency. Moreover, these are money that go down 
the drain: the subsidy is included in the price of the heating medium 
and numerous households that would not need it enjoy it too 
indirectly.  
• The "croissant and milk" programme (free meals in schools) should 
target children from families that really need this kind of support and 
not wasted in small amounts to children who do not need it 
(probably most of them don't). Ideally, parents should explicitly opt 
for being or not being included in this programme, but this selection 
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would be hard to manage in practice.  A more feasible version of 
social targeting is that schools should separately opt for being or not 
being included in the programme, since schools do incur some 
administrative and implementation costs related to it that have 
never been accounted for. Schools know exactly what the social 
situation of every student is and schools leaving the programme 
voluntarily would not create logistic or political problems.  The idea to 
extend the current version of the programme to higher age 
categories, just as the previous government proposed, should be 
dropped, at least by the time when the existing system has been 
reformed.  
• Anyway, a broader discussion should start about the social aspects 
of primary and secondary education reform, since there are 
contradictions in the way it is approached now. For instance, for 
budget-related reasons, after-school day-care centres that have 
been in place for quite a while (semi-internate, where students 
spend some time up to 16:00 hours and get lunch)  are  currently 
being closed, but on the other hand the government started this 
costly and inefficient "croissant and milk" snack programme (poor 
quality food at the wrong hours).  Based on EU-funded programmes, 
day-care centres were found to be among the social services most 
in demand in Romania nowadays, in both poor and prosperous 
communities, and many parents are willing to pay the full costs of the 
service for their children to spend safely some after-school time until 
they can pick them up. Relevant ministries should have some serious 
consultations with municipalities and mayors, who have a better 
grasp of this situation, and based on that to implement a more 
efficient and less costly policy. 
• The program to build school gyms should be downsized or 
discontinued, since it has already wasted a vast amount of public 
resources.  Most gyms built in rural communities or small towns are of 
poor quality and they burden the local budgets with maintenance 
expenses (when they were used) comparable with those of the 
schools nearby. Many of these local authorities already have 
overdue bills for utilities and they can hardly secure minimal repair 
works in classrooms.  Investments that have been made politically 
and that were fully paid from the state budget have turned into 
genuine traps for mayors eager to cut another ribbon without 
thinking what the future would for them afterwards.  In order to make 
these mayors more accountable for what they do, any such 
program should only continue provided that local authorities share 
the costs as a means of rationalising the decision regarding the 
opportunity of this investment. 
• The program subsidizing salaries of fresh graduates to incentivise 
employment should also be discontinued, at least its “universal 
coverage” version, since it is useless in communities that only report a 
4-5% unemployment rate. It could be continued though in stricter 
terms in areas (counties) where unemployment is indeed a problem 
among the young.  
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• Projects that were clearly election-driven and bankruptive should be 
terminated in some politically feasible way.  Some projects are in 
progress, such as the 90% subsidy of medication for retired persons; 
other have been enacted but not yet implemented, such as the 
promise to pay a 25% allowance to the surviving spouse. 
• Populist and utopian promises that members of the former 
government made during the election campaign should also be 
waived: indemnifying depositors who during the hyperinflation in the 
early 1990s still had their savings in a CEC account to buy a Dacia 
car; or the 30 million ROL compensation payable to owners of old 
cars who buy a new car (which is actually an indirect subsidy to 
carmakers and which should be investigated by the Competition 
Council from the standpoint of free competition, and also by the 
European Commission from the angle of the state aid).  
 
Review priorities against resources and promote free competition 
Also in terms of expenditures from the state budget, the government 
should rapidly materialize its intention to review the large infrastructure 
contracts that previous incumbents started, as transparently as possible 
and clearly explaining to the public the underlying causes for the 
decisions that will be made.  The primary issue here is not their underlying 
legal framework and how contractors were selected, and also not the 
origin of the contractor or the political retaliation that should supposedly 
be returned, but the huge and unreasonable opportunity costs, which 
exceeded not just by a percentage – but exceed several times – 
whatever Romania can afford right now. Reviewed or not, these 
projects – just as they are now – will come to a dead-end anyway for 
want of funds, and contractors know that. The most conspicuous case is 
of course that of the Braşov-Borş highway, which emerged quite out of 
the blue back at the end of 2003 and that was contracted to Bechtel 
without a tender, which will always arouse suspicion about the price.  
The strongest arguments against the project are technical and 
economic (not the ones associated to the cultural heritage as 
mentioned by Prince Charles) as follows: Romania does not have and 
will not have such a road traffic so as to justify two westward highways 
(this one, plus the one of European Corridor No. 4 that was contracted 
previously); and there will not be any connection for that on the 
Hungarian territory too soon either, since the North-East area and 
especially the route to Debrecen are not a priority to Hungary, unlike the 
connection south of Szeged; and lastly, the two highways taken 
together need every year about twice as much as Romania’s whole 
annual road budget is, which can be hardly sustained anyway, since 
the National Road Authority is already "heavily indebted"8. No one 
knows exactly where the money will come from, in circumstances where 
no "public private partnership" has materialized and costs devolved fully 
upon the state budget. 
                                                 
8 In the private sector this would mean plain bankruptcy, but senzitive information at the 
Roads Authority has always been kept under key, so the situation there is hard to assess 
precisely. 
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But this is not the only case of a highway contract – and this is not the 
only example of how the Romanian government mismanaged the 
sectoral policy. Similarly questionable are the outlays that have been 
incurred or just accepted for real estate projects via the National 
Housing Agency, which will also have to be reviewed and downsized. 
Just as with the gym program, local authorities tend to see these zero-
cost investments that are offered from the state budget as a windfall 
that they definitely need to have “while the offer is still on”, although 
they may not need it, which leads to bad resource allocation and over-
investment. This is how real estate property is taken back into public 
hands, but it has to be properly managed so that it will not be damaged 
in the future, which is a task that not too many local authorities can do 
successfully. Moreover, under the protective umbrella of “social housing 
and new homes for the young”, the National Housing Agency subsidized 
indirectly many other purely commercial projects that could have been 
implemented without money from the state, and which benefited 
people with political connections, and competition on the contracting 
market was in this way distorted. 
At any rate, the incumbent government would better take care when it 
enters into large-scale procurement or service contracts. Transparency 
rules must be observed strictly, even in projects associated to national 
security, such as the one with EADS. For instance, the likelihood is that 
Romania will soon contemplate the idea to renew its combat aircraft 
fleet. It would be good if Romania could avoid having these contracts 
politicized and surrounded by scandals, just as it happened with Central 
European nations that joined NATO a few years ago. 
The principles of transparency and free competition must also be 
strengthened in Romania at institutional level and the government 
should regard this as a priority. In terms of legislation, the Bankruptcy Law 
and the Public Procurement Law need to be improved, which is not 
difficult since people that have been working in this system already 
know very well what are the means and possibilities to evade anti-
competition provisions, and there is enough foreign technical assistance 
for that purpose. Political decision is what has been missing so far.  But 
the burden should not devolve onto legislative amendments, but on 
enforcing existing legislation – which has always been the week point In 
Romania. The Competition Authority should become more visible, 
independent and active, just like a true police of the Romanian market, 
and should be headed by a personality of probity, who should no longer 
fear rejecting anti-competitive measures even when they come from 
the government. The latest assessment that EU officials have made of 
the Competition Authority is extremely tough and, since they flagged 
modest progress, whereas the public floundering of the government 
over serious cases such as last autumn’s Rafo Refinery Government 
Ordinance pointed out that the decisions of this authority are far from 
being politically independent. 
The government also owes it to the Romanian public to evaluate and 
publish the state guarantees granted to private businesses that are still 
valid, as part of the public debt.  As soon as we all have seen which is 
the situation in this area, which is somehow connected to the provisions 
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of the acquis communautaire but which has been stealth to us so far, 
only then will we able to talk about the best way to move from now on. 
Anyway, the practice of these guarantees should be strictly regulated 
and rules should be enforced in good faith.  
Stronger market surveillance should also include talks about the 
relationship between the Competition Authority and other related 
bodies, such as the National Energy Regulatory Authority (ANRE), the 
Gas Regulatory Authority (ANRG) and the National Community Services 
Regulatory Authority (ANRSC). These institutions are all part of a joint 
area of policies and shall have to intensify their cooperation as the 
market develops and the decentralization goes on, to the disadvantage 
of the large state-owned corporations that are managed directly by 
ministries.  It must be clear that what comes first in all areas is the 
principle of free competition, which is obstructed in conditions that are 
well established, based on a unitary practice and vision – which for the 
time being is not the case with the afore-mentioned bodies, since they 
do not communicate with each other too much and since they seem to 
be rather some tribunals that make their judgments according to 
different sets of laws.  
All these changes that have been imposed by privatization, 
decentralization and the new rules of the European acquis will 
eventually change the balance of power among the traditional 
institutions of the central administration. Ministries that have been so 
important so far, such as the Ministry for Economy and Commerce9, will 
slip out of business gradually as national companies that were previously 
under their umbrella are being sold out. The role of market arbiters – 
such as the ones mentioned above – and of ministries that generate 
strategies will enhance. The same will happen – further to the 
decentralization of the major functions – to the Ministry of Education or 
the Ministry of Administration and Interior. For that matter, public servants 
all over central bodies will have to be made redundant and retrained, 
starting from those working on micro-administrative routines for various 
hierarchical structures and ending up with monitoring social effects and 
the preparation of sectoral strategies. Since not all public servants will be 
able to “migrate” toward modern expertise, they will probably have to 
be replaced. 
Political parties should be ready to manage the political effects of these 
changes that will cause certain market regulatory agencies to become 
more powerful than economic ministries. These changes should be 
regarded as a favorable opportunity, and especially the incumbent 
government should do that, since it needs to implement a major reform 
of the civil service, a reform that has been permanently postponed in 
recent years due to lack of courage and vision. The pressure on 
incumbents is twofold now: on one hand, the excessive pay raises of the 
public servants granted by the Năstase government during its past 
months in office, whose effects will start to become apparent in 2005; 
and on the other hand the need to avoid the overheating of the 
                                                 
9 This is the former Ministry of Industry, actually a traditional power centre that used to 
control the power generation and mining industries mainly. 
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economy in order to comply with the strict budget targets that have 
been negotiated with international partners. Moreover, the new law on 
Salaries In the civil Service that has been promised and postponed for 
years should also be enacted in 2005 in order to standardize and 
reorganize the public payment system. 
All these factors converge into an excellent opportunity to address all 
problems at once, in a coordinated manner, as part of the governance 
reform, through a three-step program. First of all, incumbents need to 
establish a calendar based on which to privatize and decentralize some 
important functions that are now being discharged by central 
administrative bodies. Secondly, based on this calendar, state institutions 
and the efficiency of remaining ministries and public agencies can be 
audited and a rational staffing plan with new job descriptions can be 
implemented afterwards.  In any case, this will not involve an order 
“from above” to downsize the staff by a fixed target percentage, which 
should to be applied everywhere, because although some agencies or 
offices can be completely useless or overlapping, others may be quite 
useful and should actually be in need of additional staff. The assessment 
must go on a sector-by-sector and case-by-case basis – yet it is clear 
that upon the whole the staff will have to be downsized.  Lastly, the final 
step could be to finalize the Salary Law to support the new staffing 
structure, after its budget impact will have been tested (the technical 
assistance for that is already in place), which can even lead to general 
pay raises within the same total budgetary ceiling.  Of course, no 
government likes it to reorganize the public administration and to close 
down institutions, and this is exactly the reason why this measure has 
been postponed so often. But this reorganization cannot be postponed 
for another four years, and since it must be done, then the first year in 
office is the right time to do so and not any later.  
The money is there, but nobody uses it 
The irony is that – for quite a while now – substantial funds have been 
available in Romania from either loans or non-reimbursable grants that 
were meant to help the Romanian government cover exactly the costs 
of the change, but some funds are not used fully, either because the 
patience and experience needed to use them is not there or because 
their use involves a certain amount of transparency that made them 
uninteresting to Romanian officials.  Just as a matter of example, the 
World Bank earmarked nearly $1.3 million for the Ministry of Justice under 
the PPIBL10 program for the exact purpose of funding the reform in its 
most sensitive areas that had actually been flagged by the European 
Union too (the case management system, the equipment of the courts, 
the consolidation of the Superior Council of Magistrates, new special 
courts, etc). Until December 2004, for nearly two years, the Ministry had 
only requested $200,000 for various projects.  Last year’s scandal is well-
known, when the Ministry of Health did something similar, meaning they 
disregarded some important USAID grants that had been earmarked as 
funds for this reform, because the real agenda of the senior official did 
not coincide with the one announced officially. A good idea would be 
                                                 
10 Public-Private Institutional Building Loan.  
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to create – at a central level – a database with information on the 
existing assistance that can be provided from various sources, per terms 
and sectors (for instance, in the chancellery of the prime minister). This 
would be not only a good strategic management tool at government 
level, where people often did not know what was happening in their 
own back yard, but a proof of transparency too, and would also 
provide the public opinion with a clearer picture of this area, which is so 
obscure and fragmented. 
The most important funds that Romania will get will be the structural and 
cohesion funds from the European Union, which have been used 
through the mechanisms created under Chapter 21 of the acquis 
(regional policies). This is another area that has been more or less 
ignored, [an area] where Romania is unprepared from many points of 
view. The mini-crises caused by the absorption of community funds, such 
as the one associated to the Sapard money in 2004 will recur 
periodically, because there will be ever more money. When it comes to 
regional policies, talks in Romania deviate to matters of a symbolic 
culture, easy to politicize, such as the issue of creating (or not) 
administrative regions – a matter which is completely irrelevant in the 
European context. And the attention is deterred from the crucial yet 
unspectacular task of creating those nationwide institutions that can 
better manage European funds; and to help the private sector and 
local governments generate good-quality projects so that these funds 
can be better absorbed. It is urgent to strengthen the capacity to 
collect relevant nationwide statistical data (actually the latest Country 
Report highlighted that issue) and to a create a real-time tracking 
system of how these funds are accessed and used and what their 
impact is – such as an early warning system for the European money – so 
that the government can get timely signals about the absorption 
problems, and can take measures to avoid the cyclic crises that have 
occurred so far.  
Finally, the government should continue reforms on the “active” – i.e. 
the revenue side – of the budget. In some areas, there are details that 
need to be readjusted, but these are important details of the reforms 
that have been implemented so far. For instance, last December, when 
the government ordinance that amended the Fiscal Code was 
amended so as to reflect the unique taxation rate, the authors of the 
changes overlooked the minor detail that the personal income tax (IVG 
– the global income tax) is shared among various layers of the 
administrative structures, more specifically 36% of the collected taxes go 
the local municipality, 27% to the county authorities and the rest to the 
central authorities11. Lower IVG revenues, even temporary, produced by 
the tax reform can cause serious troubles at local level, paradoxically in 
large and prosperous cities where this kind of revenue is high and the 
local government is generally headed by the DA Alliance. Urgent 
readjustment is needed in order to offset the losses of local 
governments, preferably by adjusting the shared percentages when the 
first data about the collection of January-February taxes will become 
                                                 
11 This is just a simplified presentation; the system is actually more complex than that. 
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available and when the real decrease of the revenues can be seen 
exactly as it is. 
The tax reform must go full steam ahead anyway, because the most 
problematic issue, which led to a decrease in revenues, has already 
been implemented. Hence, the measures that will be taken will lead to 
higher public revenues and a better social equity too. We are talking 
about continuing the gradual fiscal “neutralization”, on a phased basis, 
to reach the optimum level where taxpayers that earn the same 
incomes pay the same taxes, whatever the source of the income, but 
we are still far from that point. More specifically, that target involves the 
following: 
• Taxes chargeable on capital transactions, bank interests and other 
such instruments and taxes chargeable on real estate sales (that 
now are hardly taxed or not taxed at all) should be gradually 
brought in line with salary taxes; 
• Eliminate the multitude of exemptions or preferential treatments 
granted at various stages to lobby groups (for instance, tax 
exemptions of income earned by sportspersons, salaries paid to 
people in the IT industry, etc.) 
• Eliminate the absurd “meal tickets” distributed as a non-taxable 
addition to the salary, at least in the budgetary system. Meal tickets 
can very well be replaced by a prorated raise of the salary and the 
basic personal tax deduction, the staff actually enjoying the same 
amount of money, but the whole (private) industry that prints and 
distributes these coupons would be eliminated in this way since it 
does nothing but move money from one pocket into the other at a 
considerable cost. 
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REGIONAL 
 
THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 
Is anyone ready for sunflower harvest in Chişinǎu? 
 
Recent elections in Ukraine and Georgia have opened the door to 
Europe for two countries that seemed lost for good in the so-called 
“gray-zone” in the East. However, it seems that Moldova would not 
choose the same way. The changes that occurred in the two countries 
benefited from the revolutionary context explained through the 
existence of an “infrastructure of change”, an infrastructure so solid that 
it prevailed over reactionary forces in terms of both ideology and 
organization. This section of the report will try to assess whether such 
conditions favorable to change are present in the Moldovan case as 
well.  
The Communists in Moldova are becoming more and more 
European 
Although some of the press-attaches of the CPM were quick to accuse 
in 2004 the West of intending to carry out a "special operation" in 
Moldova, under the name of ‘sun-flower upheaval’12, independent 
political analysts have concluded that such changes can occur only if 
there is a strong combination of local and foreign elites consensus on 
the common objectives which are to be pursued, and values that are to 
be defended.  
But who are actually those local elites, since the Communist party 
declared its intention of: 
• integrating the Republic of Moldova into the EU 
• modernizing the country 
• regulating the long-protracted Transdnestrian conflict through its 
internationalization? 
                                                 
12 The official News Agency, Moldpress, launched this rumor in the summer of 2004, 
accusing some political forces in the West of willing to multiply the Georgian Rose 
Revolution in Moldova under the name of ‘Sunflower Revolution’, and this issue 
remained a hot-story in the governmental press until the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. 
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Therefore, one may say that the CPM’s leaders were the first to realize 
that it was useless to fight back ‘European calls’ in Moldova and, after a 
number of disgraceful statements13, President Voronin announced its 
vision to see Moldova fully integrated in the EU. The very prospect of 
reaching one day the European club of ‘prosperity and security’ was, in 
itself, enough to trigger the transformation of a communist party, as 
happened before in Central Europe or Romania. Opinion polls show that 
80% of the population considers the integration in the EU as the right 
thing to do, while 40% of them declare that becoming a NATO member 
is good, so no one can play anymore with the outdated and ridiculous 
arguments of Moldova’s predestination to remain locked to Russia. As 
noticed during local elections in May 2003, the Communist Party of 
Moldova “stole” a lot of ideological slogans from the Opposition in order 
to create themselves a pro-European image and to increase their 
appeal to a segment of Europe-oriented reformists. And here is where 
the strength and the particularities of the ruling CPM in Moldova lay – 
the incredible capacity to adapt itself to the quick-sand realities of the 
Moldovan landscape. It was not therefore strange to see President 
Voronin flanked by President Basescu among other heads of state, 
invited to Kyiev for the inauguration of the new Ukrainian President, 
Victor Iushchenko, apparently willing to show that there is not the 
‘orange’ that makes up upheavals, but the ‘characters’ and he is one 
of those who are not to be thrown out. 
With the gradual worsening of its relations to Moscow, the President’s 
staff (which has a dominant role in the CPM’s political affairs) realized 
that its leftist ideology can be accommodated to the European left-
wing parties, and that the ‘internal’ discourse, oriented specifically to an 
acculturated and visibly-aged electorate should be also adjusted if not 
upgraded. Yet the PCM leadership did not denounce its ‘communist 
brand’, but many explain this procrastinated inertia rather through 
electoral reasoning than by the Marxist-Leninist heritage. This is why the 
CPM Congress has adopted at its ordinary Congress a series of changes 
to the party program, which include now inter alia recognition of private 
ownership, multiparty system, and European integration – objectives that 
that would certainly look more like a left-oriented socialist party 
somewhere in Sweden or Italy than in the former Soviet Union. Many 
observed that most of the promises of the CPM in 2001 have been 
purged from the agenda of the party, while some of them – like joining 
the Russia – Belarus Union, or resolving the Transdnestrian conflict – have 
been constantly put under the shelf to the greatest desolation of the 
CPM traditional voters, which still find difficult to accept that their 
nostalgias cannot serve as an alternative to the capitalism and EU.  
Under these circumstances the stake in the March 2005 elections may 
not be Europe, as all major political forces define themselves as pro-
European, so an important ingredient of the Orange Revolution seems 
to be missing. However, the energies emanated from Tbilisi and Kiev had 
                                                 
13 In April 2001, President Voronin said that the R.Moldova will be like a Cuba in 
Europe. One month later, in an interview to the Russian news-agencies, he 
claimed that if the Communists would not won the elections in Moldova, 
NATO’s tanks were then located around Briansk, 200 km from Moscow. 
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a very important role in deciding for the European destination of 
Moldova, by providing excellent opportunities to the resolution of the 
protracted conflicts and unsettled border disputes with Ukraine.  
Unlike Ukraine, where the dividing line between the East and West, 
between pro-Yanucovich camps of nostalgic industrialized Ukraine and 
a profoundly agricultural, nationalistic, pro-western Ukraine, backing 
Yushchenko, in Moldova electoral cleavages are less ideological and 
more determined by social and cultural motivations. Indeed, Moldova 
has the biggest percent of rural population in Europe and has managed 
to become the poorest country on the continent. Criticized for going 
back to the old-fashioned system of ‘raions’, the CPM succeeded to 
essentially strengthen its local party-branches, and bring administration 
closer to top-executive controls14. Rapporteurs of the Council of Europe 
tried to determine central authorities to reconsider their plan of re-
designing the system of public administration, and only after several 
debates and expert round-tables in February – March, government 
officials and Communist deputies showed themselves ready to follow 
the spirit of the European Charter on Local Self-Governance (ratified in 
1997) and improve it quickly after elections. Both the IMF and the World 
Bank disagreed with the aforementioned reforms, as there were few 
chances to foresee how the central authorities plan to implement them, 
and even less, which would be the benefits of the reform for the social 
and economic growth of the country.  
The Current Electoral Alignment  
Due to the very high threshold – 3% for independent candidates and 6% 
for political parties – many of the voters have lost their confidence in 
elections as such. Moreover, the irreconcilable fractures within the 
mainstream of the opposition and the lack of its ‘unity’ also explain the 
very large segment of still undecided voters (35%).  
Compared with the IPP Barometer from November 2004, an IRI/Gallup 
Survey in December showed a somewhat falling rating of both major 
contenders: the ruling Communist Party - 39% and the Democratic 
Moldova - 13%, against the background of the rising popularity of the 
Christian Democratic Popular Party (CDPP – about 15%) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SDPM - 8%). Opposition leaders simply refuse to 
understand that they lost the 2001 elections due to their internal fights 
and quarrels. Because of their little confidence that they will be able to 
overrun the ruling regime of the CPM, they have now entered into a 
coalition which is still weak and unknown to the public.  
                                                 
14 In March 2003, a Law on local self-governance14 was adopted against the fierce 
opposition of the non-communist parties and associations of local governments. Under 
these reforms, the ten (10) constituent regions (judets) of Moldova were replaced by (32) 
thirty two districts (raions). This policy has reversed the pace of territorial arrangements 
laid down in 1999 by previous Governments, receiving praise from the international 
community. To clear up the road towards is strategic objective, since 2001, the ruling 
party has initiated a largely contested reform of the local governments, consisting mainly 
by a territorial re-division of the country, along with essential limitations of the mandate 
of local governments in budgeting, properties and policy-making. 
 R O M A N I A N  A C A D E M I C  S O C I E T Y  ( S A R )  
 
 
30 
 
Moldova lacks a credible and strong Opposition leader who acted as a 
motor for what happened in Georgia and Ukraine. There is no current 
politician of the Opposition ranking as a national leader in the 
electorate’s eyes. With the exception of Serafim Urechean (14%), the 
second after Vladimir Voronin, but at a very large distance in ratings – 
26%, the rest of the Opposition leaders remain almost unnoticed by 
conventional electorate (Dumitru Braghis – 4%, Oleg Serebrian – 3%, 
Oazu Nantoi – 3%)15. Despite a relatively good position in ratings (9%), 
Iurie Rosca’s popularity was seriously damaged by a record-rate of non-
confidence (41%), followed by Voronin (15%), Braghis (5%) and the 
former presidents Snegur and Lucinschi.  
On the other hand, it might be admitted that Moldova has some 
tradition with respect to another element of the Orange Revolution, i.e. 
a relatively wide social basis for easy-erupting mass rallies and other 
forms of organized protests. In fact, Moldova gained notoriety in the last 
decade for successive waves of mass-protests, student’s strikes, non-stop 
demonstrations and, quite recently, by mob-protests, much more spread 
than in Kiev, Minsk, or even Tbilisi. Thus, in 1995 students protested against 
the ‘unlawful’ introduction of Moldovan-history textbooks instead of 
Romanian History for more than 2 month, while in 1999 students 
protested against cancellation of social benefits and clashed with 
police for over one month. The students have been also hurt by the 
elimination of some social "privileges", which sparked protests far more 
spectacular than those of a few sympathetic loyalists of the Opposition 
parties. Moreover, since January 2002 till April the same year, the 
opposition assembled a ‘city of tents’ in front of the Presidency and the 
Parliament buildings in Chisinau, where they stood up against 
perpetrated abuses on the ‘cultural rights’ of the titular-group, and 
protested until the unpopular decisions of the Ministry of Education were 
finally canceled.  
Abandoning the pro-European rhetoric and the grand idea of a ‘social 
pact’ for the entire society, the CPM’s leaders have immersed into a 
campaign of expelling the ‘Romania-minded’ professors and courses 
from the universities, while denouncing ‘brain-washing’ and foreign 
interventions from the neighboring countries. Protests were so strong that 
former presidents Lucinschi, Snegur had to admit that the quick erosion 
of their credibility and popularity score was a direct result of the street’s 
resentments. Every time people stand up for their rights, they send the 
kind of message that is then articulated through a protest vote in 
elections. Lastly, the refusal of the President Voronin to sign up the Kozak 
Memorandum16 can be also explained through a massive wave of 
public unrest and street-demonstrations that exhilarated the capital city 
life for more than 3 months during the fall of 2003. Massive protests 
served as an excuse for the President Voronin to refrain himself from 
undersigning the Russian-proposed Memorandum, which has thus 
largely infuriated the Russian President, and made his advisors blame 
                                                 
15 IRI and Baltic Surveys/ The Gallup Organisation, Moldova National Voters Study, 
November 2004 
16 October 1-3, 2004, The Wall Street Journal Europe, An Opportunity on the Dniester, 
Vladmir Socor  
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Voronin for being ‘politically irresponsible and inconsistent’. Some 
observers still believe that this short episode allowed him to build up a 
new image as a ‘country savior’ against perpetrated foreign plots.  
As could be expected, the CPM electoral list is headed by the party 
leader and President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, 
followed by Parliament Chairwoman Eugenia Ostapciuc, Prime Minister 
Vasily Tarlev, several ministers and so on. The fact that these personalities 
are among the ‘first 20’ candidates indicates that the CPM's electoral 
stake is based on the positive results achieved during the last 4 years, 
particularly in the economic and social spheres: a higher GDP, increase 
of pensions and salaries, but also the attempt to ‘clean’ the CPM from 
corrupt elements.  
The CPM Platform does not bring any big surprises either. Its main topics 
refer to the legal and social protection of Moldovan workers abroad, to 
increasing the average monthly incomes up to $300 equivalent 
[currently about $100], to the tripling of salaries and pensions, and to the 
increase of State-funded places in higher educational institutions. 
However, considerable changes can be noticed with regard to the 
Foreign Policy Program, as the Communists – unlike 4 years ago – are not 
promising any more that Moldova will join the Russia-Belarus Union, or 
that Russian shall become a second official language in this republic. 
These two ‘omissions’, combined with the active pro-Europe attitude of 
the ruling party in 2004, seem to have caused the fall of the CPM's 
popularity rating. Those citizens who supported the Communists in 2001 
primarily because of their clear-cut pro-Russia stance were definitely 
disappointed. Despite this trend, one could hardly expect that the 
CPM's popularity rating would drop below 40%, which would still allow 
the party to assure itself a significant number of seats in the next 
Parliament. They might prove unable to ensure a similar rate of success 
as in the February 2001 elections, but they have quite a bit of chances 
to retain at least a simple parliamentary majority, which will allow them 
to elect the Chairman of the House and seriously influence the creation 
of the Government, where their people will form an overwhelming 
majority. 
Yet there are unresolved issues from the previous elections that still 
represent a major handicap to the ruling party. Thus, corruption is clearly 
spread out and has been criticized by the CPM only in what concerned 
their political enemies, although the ‘agile and connected’ relatives 
and friends of the acting President Voronin became quickly a kind of 
‘etalon’ conduct to other business groups. Moreover, those who did not 
obey the rules imposed by this network became subjects of 
exaggerated taxation and tough pressures from the tax-control bodies. 
As a result, seeking protection from the state and party nomenclature, 
melted with various forms of favoritism, easy-assigned contracts without 
open tenders, or bribes for some ‘strategic jobs’ in the customs, ministries 
and state agencies, form a kind of ‘El-Dorado’ business for the CPM, 
where various clan interests are pursued and oligarch networks are 
designed. At the same time, the control over the judiciary allowed the 
CPM leaders to reign almost undisputedly, as there is little risk that its 
members would be prosecuted and indicted for their abuses. 
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Particularly painful was to see how the CPM treated independent mass 
media and local authorities. Physical attacks against journalists in July – 
August 2004, and dismissal of the most active protesters from the public 
TV Company were particularly serious matters, which brought these 
cases to the Council of Europe and the EHRC17.  
The three main contenders creating the non-communist Opposition are 
the traditional CDPP (former Popular Front), the Social-Democrat Party 
and the Democratic Moldova Bloc (incorporating the Democratic Party, 
the Social Liberal Party, the Liberal Party and the ‘Our Moldova’ 
Alliance). Some of these competitors were quick to declare that 
Moldova will follow after Ukraine, and the ‘orange’ has been 
announced to become the color of the vociferous Christian Democrat 
Popular Party. 
The Baltic Survey held in December 2004 indicated a certain ascent of 
the voting intentions for the CDPP (15%), in a pair with the SDP (8%), 
while the DMB remained at 14%. What is still astonishing is the high ‘non-
answer’ response (37% in March, and 35% in November, 2004). The 
survey also shows a decline of the ruling CPM (38%, down from 47%, in 
March 2004), although the large disparage between the Communists 
and the rest of the opposition (over 20%) has not decreased 
significantly. Certain political analysts argue that such a difference is 
explained by the several internal drawbacks of the largest centrist-
based election block during pre-election arrangements, as these parties 
showed unstable and unable to commit their leaders to a long-lasting 
winning effort. The lack of a long-term strategy of winning elections, as 
well as the poor visibility of its leaders left the voters largely unaware 
about the political identity of the block.  
Probably the biggest mistake of this Block was electing the current 
Mayor of Chisinau, Serafim Urecheanu, as its official political leader. As 
following events showed, Urechean became quickly one of the favorite 
targets of a fully-fledged blackmailing campaign on issues of corruption, 
staggered by the CPM. Under these conditions, Urecheanu found it 
difficult to comply with two difficult missions: on one hand, he had to 
defend himself and his entourage from corruption allegations and, on 
the other hand, he was expected to articulate and deliver to the 
potential voters a message reflecting the particular profile of the block 
of centrists-liberals, social-liberals and democrats.  
Different from the MDB, the Christian Democrats were the first party in 
Moldova to have reacted to the events in Ukraine and Georgia, and to 
have declared ‘orange’ as the color of their election campaign. The 
party adopted wearing orange ties, scarves, and vests, proclaiming that 
‘orange’ is the color of victory in the upcoming elections. 
                                                 
17 According to the Article 19 conclusion, the ‘public offenses made by the authorities 
were not only violations of the right to freedom of expression, but also of the right not to 
be subjected to ill-treatment, protected by Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT)17; and the right of security of person, protected by Article 
5 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
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The conclusions of the IRI/Baltic Survey indicates that the CPM is trusted 
mostly by elderly voters (over 50 years of age) and rural population; in 
turn, the CDPP is trusted by younger voters and rural residents, expressing 
a more pronounced Romanian identity; the Democratic Moldova Bloc 
seems to be trusted mostly by younger voters, as well as by those 
democracy-oriented public officials; the Social Democratic Party is 
trusted mostly by middle-aged voters and rural population.  
But who are actually the most sensitive supporters for a change in 
power? The first and, perhaps the largest group that feels insecure under 
the ruling Communists might be called ‘the white-collar’, middle-class 
representatives: managers and entrepreneurs, patent-holders and 
experts, lawyers and intelligentsia who feel threatened by the regime, 
while seeking to establish their own ‘class-based’ priorities of the state on 
an exclusionary manner. The main source of their irritation is the 
incompetence, arrogance and interventionist character of the new 
ruling nomenclature of ‘party-appointed clerks’ in almost every aspect 
of public life in Moldova. Tax-evasion by ‘party-beloved patriots’, as well 
as indirect taxation of the business forced to contribute to various 
monumental experiments of the Communist rulers were rather the rule 
than the exception during the last 4 years. At the same time, 
persecutions and arrests of Opposition leaders were pursued as an 
example for anyone who would ‘dare’ to challenge the authoritarian 
decisions of the President Voronin.  
The second such group consists of students, who were repeatedly 
libeled as being connected to the ‘anti-statal politicians’ and whose 
vote is clearly a non-communist one.  
The third group of anti-communist voters is made up of those surviving 
on the money received from their relatives working abroad. To many of 
them, the insistent claims regarding the continuous GDP growth rate 
seem nothing more than a gloomy joke, which extensively alienates 
political discourse from the reality.  
A fourth group of discouraged belongs to the so called ‘Russian-
speakers’ who felt themselves humiliated and abandoned due to the 
sudden change of Voronin’s priorities.  
The success of the CPM in reducing the public political space to 
absolute minimum has left the Opposition without a meaningful 
presence at the national level. It is hardly possible to expect that the 
activists from these groups will unite like proletarians of all countries in the 
old Communist slogan. But the erosion of a once solid and vast support 
base for the CPM is unmistakable.  
This does not sound very encouraging for those politicians that would like 
to rely on a higher rate of voter’s participation, and who by virtue of 
their minority statute in the legislature, have no chance to amend the 
Election Code, by bringing those citizens residing outside of Moldova to 
vote in the upcoming elections. Nor were they able to downgrade the 
election threshold set up at 3% for independent candidates, 6% for 
parties, and 9% for two-party election coalitions.  
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The Regional Context  
While many in the West were keen to point to the serious ‘personal 
defeat’ of President Putin in the Ukrainian elections, few were to remind 
to the public on the quick transformation of the older ‘frontal habits’ into 
something that is reassembling a combination of protectionist capitalism 
with imperialist flavor.  
It is noteworthy that during the entire run-off in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin did 
not even try to hide his sympathies and unilateral back-up to one of the 
competitors. He visited Ukraine twice to publicly announce his support 
for Yanukovych, while a huge number of Russian PR- consultants close to 
him played a major role in shaping both the strategy and the message 
of the Yanukovych campaign. Hundreds of millions of dollars went into 
these elections, which were described as a kind of the last outpost for 
Russia to show its geopolitical influence in its ‘near abroad’ – already a 
‘new neighborhood of the EU’. As protests in Kiev gathered momentum, 
Putin asked the outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, eager to secure a 
safe retirement amid charges of corruption and political violence, to 
declare Yanukovych the winner and end the show, making thus clear 
that Moscow would not accept a Yushchenko victory. This was perhaps 
the reason why Kuchma suddenly decided to withdraw his support to 
Yanukovych.  
Analysts argue that by failing to impose Putin’s will in Ukrainian elections 
signified in fact that the era of imperialist Russia was over, and that most 
of the projects that were announced by Putin in order to restore the 
Russian hegemony in the near abroad failed. The Kremlin's recent 
foreign-policy failures, particularly its inglorious defeat in the "battle for 
Ukraine,18" appear to have sparked a review of Russia's policies towards 
its neighbors in the post-Soviet space19.  
Opposite to the Ukrainian case, the political struggle in Moldova is 
important not necessarily as a logical continuation of the political 
confrontation between democrats and autocrats, typical for the former 
Soviet Union states, as many see it as a last chance of ‘saving Putin’s 
honor’, but also as a tool for potentially solving the ‘issue’ of 
Transdnestria, where Kremlin’s separatist regime hijacked the de facto 
control over a thin strip of land for more than 13 years.  
Transdnestria was, in fact, the ‘litigious apple’ with the previous Ukrainian 
political elite, which has repeatedly refused any initiative of controlling 
the border with the separatist enclave. As soon as Iushchenko will be 
convinced by the EU and the US to close the Ukrainian-Transdnestria 
border, in order to put to an end the enormous flow of arms traffic, 
drugs, alcohol, cars, etc. which allowed Smirnov to get very rich and 
reign undisputedly for the last decade, the Tiraspol regime will collapse. 
Smirnov’s position is weak also because of its clear-cut identification with 
Kremlin, whose military, political and economic backup played a great 
                                                 
18 ‘Never Say Never' - The Ukrainian revolution and the renaissance of democracy. By 
Claudia Roset, Wednesday, December 15, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST 
19 Ирина Гречухина, ИноСМИ.Ru, Опубликовано на сайте inosmi.ru: 18 января 2005, 
12:24 
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role in the region, although the Ukrainian factor was also a critical factor 
of stability and support.  
Quickly after the election of Iushchenko, President Voronin stated that 
now he expected to receive from Ukrainian leadership full support to 
regain control over Transdnestria. The official reaction from Kyiev 
followed immediately. Starting from January 28, new instructions issued 
by the Ukrainian Administration provided that all cargoes for 
Transdnestria delivered via the Ukrainian territory must be covered with 
appropriate contracts certified by Moldova customs organs20, thus 
assuring of registration of all the exports from the breakaway region by 
the Moldovan Government. Many saw the new policy of the Ukrainian 
authorities as a response to the EU’s strong demands to stop 
unauthorized flows of good with Transnistria.  
The separatist enclave appeared to be one of the big ‘losers’ of the 
orange revolution in Ukraine. And there is a long list of reasons why 
Smirnov and Co. have to worry about the shift of power in Ukraine, with 
the promises to shed a new light over the ‘misdoings’ tolerated earlier by 
the close-to-Kuchma oligarchs. Moreover, hardly will be anyone be 
ready to forget the fact that independent experts were not allowed to 
oversee the turnout in the region, some were even beaten off and 
extradited which allowed Ianukovich to collect almost 98% of votes. 
Forecast on the post-electoral evolution 
As reported by Radio Liberty recently, the Stratford Research Center 
(USA) is forecasting that in 2005, the West - under US guidance - will 
continue its strategy of replacing pro-Russia regimes with pro-West ones 
in former Soviet republics. The Center presumes that such attempts will 
be undertaken in Moldova, Armenia, Belarus and in some FSU Central 
Asiatic republics, "although not all such efforts will be crowned with 
success". The Center analysts think that the West's efforts will be the most 
fruitful ones in Moldova and Armenia. While differences between 
Moldova and Ukraine or Georgia are obvious, the caveats are too 
resounding. People-power revolutions do not always succeed with a first 
try. In most of the ‘administrative-led democracies’ democrats stand 
with little chance if any at all unless the political circumstances are 
going to change. And democracy depends on institutions that need 
time to evolve, i.e. appropriate strengthening of the independent 
media, neutral and honest judiciary power, local autonomy and a 
market safe from interventionist policies of the Government.  
In spite of the vociferous claims of the ruling party to be the ‘good guys’ 
in bringing Moldova on perhaps the last band-wagon for an European 
destination, particularly those undemocratic steps and policies then 
sharply criticized in 2002, 2003 and 2004 by the European international 
organizations were, in fact, the ‘no’ answers to the official request for EU 
integration. The latest actions of the Communist-controlled government 
and Parliament in Chisinau may drive Moldova onto a path that is 
difficult to oversee. The pro-European, pro-reformist, and pro-
democracy rhetoric delivered by President Voronin or his communist 
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comrades from the Parliament and Cabinet are unable to hide the real 
danger facing Moldova today - to be left outside of the orbit of EU 
integration process, de-legitimize the attempts made so far to 
democratic and prosperous society in Moldova, and hence condemn 
its population to a pitiful future.  
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